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I. Introduction
Substantive due process is one of the most controversial yet enduring prin
ciples of constitutional law. Despite criticism over the years, it continues to shape
current developments of individual rights and limits on governmental power. One
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of the most traditional manifestations of substantive due process is the doctrine of
incorporation—the doctrine by which a court determines whether an enumerated
or unenumerated right is incorporated into the concept of due process and thereby
enforced against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.1
According to conventional accounts of the Fourteenth Amendment,
incorporation was meant to be accomplished through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, not the Due Process Clause.2 The Due Process Clause, as the story goes,
obtained a substantive interpretation only because the Slaughter-House Cases
(Slaughter-House) foreclosed use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect
substantive rights, both enumerated and unenumerated, by holding that the
clause only referred to rights of national citizenship.3 Because the Court refused to
interpret the Privileges or Immunities Clause as giving any substantive protection
of rights, scholars argue that the doctrine of due process evolved far beyond its
original meaning.4 Many scholars argue that the Slaughter-House interpretation of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was just plain wrong.5

1

See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

See Judith A. Baer, Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth
Amendment 107 (1983); Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights 57–91 (1986); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth
Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 110–47 (1988). See generally Akhil
Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against States?, 19 Harv. J.
L. & Pub. Pol’y 443 (1996); Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, Justice Miller, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 Chi-Kent L. Rev 627 (1994); Micahel
Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (2007); Kevin Christopher Newsom,
Setting Incoprationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 Yale L. J. 643
(2000); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court
and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 Ohio St. L.J.
1051 (2000). But see Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights
(1989) (arguing intensely against incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause); Erwin Chemrinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 481
(2d ed. 2002) (“In all likelihood, there were members of the Congress that passed the Fourteenth
Amendment and of the state legislatures that ratified it who believed that it applied the Bill of Rights
to the states and others who rejected this view. . . there is not a single discernable intent on the issue
of incorporation.”).
2

3

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79–80 (1873).

Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty
207–08 (2004) (“A judicial assessment of the necessity and propriety of state laws is entirely
consistent with the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. For this reason, a
doctrine of ‘substantive due process’ restores rather than violates the original historical meaning
of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole from the damage done by SlaughterHouse.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 489 (15th ed. 2004)
(“The Slaughter-House Cases temporarily blocked the utilization of the Fourteenth Amendment
privileges or immunities clause as a substantive restraint on state legislation. But a generation later,
a new majority embraced substantive due process and a novel ‘liberty of contract’ argument.”).
4

5

See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3029–30 (2010) (collecting authority).
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In 2010, the history and validity of substantive due process stood before
the Supreme Court once more as the Court considered whether the Second
Amendment applied to the states in McDonald v. City of Chicago.6 The petitioners
in McDonald argued that the right to keep and bear arms is among the privileges
or immunities of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and gave
the modern Court an opportunity to overturn the maligned Slaughter-House
opinion and to limit the reach of substantive due process by shifting the analysis
of incorporation to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, where many believed
the analysis should have been rooted originally.7 The Court, however, declined to
revisit the correctness of the Slaughter-House opinion and determined that because
the Due Process Clause had been used for decades to determine whether rights
were protected against state infringement under the Fourteenth Amendment, it
remained the operative theory.8
In doing so, and perhaps without recognizing it, the Court remained true
to an original interpretation of the Due Process Clause applied in the first
several decades after the Slaughter-House opinion. The modern Court employed
the doctrine of substantive due process that had been preserved and protected
through years of disuse. After the Court decided Slaughter-House in 1873, it
failed to invoke the Due Process Clause to protect substantive rights—especially
enumerated protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights—for the next twentyfive years.9 Nevertheless, the Court never denied its power to invoke due process
6

Id. at 3020.

See id. at 3028; Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521–28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Barnett, supra note 4; Lawrence, supra note 2; Newsom, supra note 2.
7

8

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030.

See Jerome Barron et al., Constitutional Law Principles and Policy: Cases and
Materials 459–60 (LexisNexis 7th ed. 2006) (stating that the “Slaughter-House Cases could
be described as a triumph of positivism over natural laws” and that after Slaughter-House the
“courts would not independently fashion individual rights.”); Paul Brest et al., Processes of
Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 412 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2006).
(“After the Slaughterhouse Cases, corporations could not expect aid from the privileges or immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Justice Miller’s opinion gave even shorter shrift to
the Due Process Clause, the natural law tradition clinging to that clause and its inviting references
to ‘property’ and ‘liberty’ led corporate lawyers to seize on it.”); John E. Nowak & Ronald D.
Rotunda, Constitutional Law 438–40 (Thomson West 7th ed. 2004) (“The Supreme Court’s
reluctance to give an expansive reading to the Constitution was exemplified dramatically in its first
major attempt to interpret and apply the provision of the new Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The
Court decided that the due process provision only guaranteed that states would enact laws according
to the dictates of procedural due process. . . . In short the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not guarantee the substantive fairness of laws passed by state legislatures. . . . A
majority of the immediate post-Civil War Supreme Court, however, was not willing to read into
the Fourteenth Amendment any substantive due process guarantee.”); Sullivan & Gunther, supra
note 4, at 485 (“In its first interpretation of the [Fourteenth] Amendment, in the Slaughter-House
Cases, the majority rejected any notion of substantive due process. But the dissenters’ plea for the
protection of fundamental values prevailed by the end of the [nineteenth] century.”); Aynes, supra
note 2, at 686; Joseph Fred Benson, A Brief Legal History of Impeachment in Missouri, 75 UMKC
9
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to protect substantive rights. Ironically, the Court avoided invoking substantive
due process by upholding the theory of substantive due process. Repeatedly, the
Court determined that the Due Process Clause could protect substantive rights
against state infringement but declined to provide such protection in the cases
before it, waiting for another day when the violation was too egregious, too
arbitrary, or to capricious to allow.10 Not until 1897 did the Court employ the
Due Process Clause to protect a right guaranteed in the Bill of Rights against state
infringement.11 That year, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of
Chicago (Chicago, Burlington & Quincy), the Court upheld a substantive property
right by holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
required states to provide just compensation for any taking of private property.12
In determining the original meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment, scholars focus on historical evidence from the years before the

L. Rev. 333, 342 n.54 (2006) (“Until the adoption of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment in 1868,
and the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the concept of substantive due
process remained a limited theory in our law.”); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 Va. L. Rev. 493 passim (1997); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74
Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1414 n.10 (1974) (“In essence, the father of substantive due process was
Mr. Justice Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cases. . . . Contrary to the majority in that case, both he
and Mr. Justice Field found inalienable rights in the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Nelson Lund &
John. O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1562 (2004)
(“In the early years after Slaughter-House, however, a minority of the Court also made efforts to
bend the Due Process Clause into a general tool for banning statutes found to be oppressive, or
unjustified by the public good.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future—Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
110 passim (1999); James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 443, 542 n.488 (1999) (“Early
on, the Court summarily rejected the idea of substantive due process in the Slaughter-House Cases.”);
G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s Lochner Dissent, 63 Brook. L.
Rev. 87, 107–28 (1997); David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet-Proposed Limits on State
Jurisdiction Over Data Communication in Tort Cases, 87 Ky. L. J. 95, 146 (1999) (describing the
Court’s rejection of substantive due process in the Slaughter-House Cases).
10
Such avoidance tactics are not uncommon in the Court’s past or present. In the widely
anticipated health care decision, for example, Chief Justice Roberts employed a similar approach
regarding the limits of the taxing power. Roberts found that the individual mandate was not a tax,
but affirmed that “Congress’s ability to use its taxing power to influence conduct is not without
limits. . . . Because the tax at hand is within even those strict limits, we need not here decide the
precise point at which exaction becomes so punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it.”
Nat’l Federation of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599–2600 (2012). Of course, Roberts
was discussing limits on an enumerated power granted to Congress by the Constitution and not
the protection of rights against state infringement under the Due Process Clause, but the approach
is similar—in both situations, the court maintained its ability to define the contours of a right or
power but declined to do so at that time.
11

Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

12

Id. at 241.
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Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification and from the colonial era.13 Those scholars
who have traced the development of substantive due process during the thirty
years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment have analyzed several
rate regulation cases, arguing that these cases paved the way for the Court to strike
down economic legislation in the early twentieth century.14 In Munn v. Illinois,
for example, the Court indicated that the Due Process Clause required police
regulations to be “clothed with a public interest” in order to be constitutionally
valid.15 The Court determined, in a later rate-making case, that if states deprived
the railroad companies of the power to set reasonable rates, it would constitute
“in substance and effect” a deprivation of property without due process of law.16
The Court’s willingness to apply the Due Process Clause to strike down economic
legislation culminated in Allgeyer v. Louisiana 17 and was exemplified by Lochner
v. New York.18 In both cases, the Court found that an unenumerated “liberty of
contract” was encompassed in notions of due process and struck down police
power infringements on that right as unreasonable.
This exclusive focus on the post-ratification development of substantive due
process through economic rate regulation cases, however, has caused scholars
to overlook an interesting pattern in substantive due process cases in which the
Court refused to grant due process protections against state infringement but
maintained its ability to do so. In the intervening years between Slaughter-House
and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, the Court repeatedly declined to apply the
Due Process Clause to protect rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights against state
infringement.19 The Court denied individuals procedural protections in trials,
13
See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672 (2012); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive
Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 Emory L.J.
585 (2009); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L.J.
408 (2010).

Barron et al., supra note 9, at 459–60; Sullivan & Gunther, supra note 4, at 485 (citing
Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890); Santa Clara Cnty. v. Southern Pac. R.
Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); The Railroad Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877); Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)).
14

15

Munn, 94 U.S. at 139.

16

Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 134 U.S. at 458.

165 U.S. 578 (1897) (holding that a prohibition on doing business with out-of-state
companies was a violation of right to contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).
17

198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a statute prohibited employers from working more
than sixty hours per week was a violation of the right to contract protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
18

19
The doctrine of “incorporation” has a mid-twentieth century resonance due to the Court’s
decisions in the 1950s and 1960s describing “selective incorporation” and “total incorporation.”
Because it is somewhat anachronistic to discuss “incorporation” in the 1870s to 1900, this article
uses the parlance of the 1800s: whether the Due Process Clause applies the Bill of Rights to the states
or limits state power.
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such as the rights to a civil jury trial 20 and an impartial jury,21 as well as substantive
protections, such as prohibitions of unreasonable searches or seizures 22 and cruel
or unusual punishments.23 These initial failures to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states as part of due process led some to argue that despite the framers’ original
expectations for the Due Process Clause, the Court’s original understanding of the
clause did not include protection for substantive rights.24 Even though the Court
failed to protect substantive rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights through the
Due Process Clause, it used ambiguous and broad language to describe what the
Due Process Clause protected. In doing so, the Court’s description of due process
preserved the option of protecting substantive rights through the Due Process
Clause. While declining to immediately apply the doctrine, the Court prepared
the path for the Due Process Clause to protect substantive rights in the future.
Part II of this article uses lower court decisions decided immediately after
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and the Supreme Court
decision in Slaughter-House in 1873 to argue that courts’ original interpretation of
the Due Process Clause was expansive and substantive. These early courts, while
primarily focusing on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, understood the Due
Process Clause to be a fallback provision to protect liberty, a broader description
of both procedural and substantive protections of life, liberty, and property. Part
III argues that the Court’s treatment of the Due Process Clause from SlaughterHouse to Chicago, Burlington & Quincy maintained this broad understanding of
the meaning of due process and preserved the notion of substantive due process.
Again and again, the Court refused to apply protections enumerated in the Bill
of Rights to the states but nevertheless indicated that the Due Process Clause
protected fundamental rights and that the Court might use the Due Process Clause
to strike down unreasonable or arbitrary legislation in the future. In other words,
the Court in the late nineteenth century chose not to use the Due Process Clause
expansively but preserved the conceptual option of substantive due process. Part
IV points to the possible social, economic, and political factors that shaped the
Court’s curious treatment of due process. In light of the turmoil at the end of the
nineteenth century, the Court’s ambivalent treatment of substantive due process
before the Lochner era demonstrates a more complex doctrinal development than
the traditional Slaughter-House and rate regulation stories suggest.

20

See Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876).

21

See Ex Parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).

22

See id.

23

See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).

See generally Berger, supra note 2; Hermine Herta Meyer, The History and Meaning
Fourteenth Amendment: Judicial Erosion of the Constitution Through the Misuse
of the Fourteenth Amendment 203 (1977); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights: The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 132 (1949); Stanley
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights: The Judicial Interpretation,
2 Stan. L. Rev. 140, 162–70 (1949).
24

of the
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II. The Early Understanding of the Due Process Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.”25 The early interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause was enmeshed with that of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. After ratification, a pressing constitutional issue
was whether these clauses would apply the protections enumerated in the Bill of
Rights to the states. Many scholars argue the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not
the Due Process Clause, was intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states.26
Scholars argue the Court eventually used the Due Process Clause only because
Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion so narrowly defined the rights protected
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause that it was rendered useless as a vehicle to
limit state police power.27
While contemporary scholarship continues to focus on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as the proper vehicle to apply the Bill of Rights to the states, it
has not generally explored the original meaning of the Due Process Clause in this
regard.28 A closer look at lower court decisions decided shortly after the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment and before the Slaughter-House opinion reveals
that the original meaning of the Due Process Clause encompassed more than
bare procedural protections. Because these courts interpreted the Privileges or
Immunities and Due Process Clauses together and rarely distinguished between
the two clauses, it is possible that those who believed the Privileges or Immunities
Clause applied the Bill of Rights to the states also contemplated that the Due
Process Clause carried some sort of substantive, residual protection to accomplish
the same result.

A. Due Process Clause Shortly After the Ratification of the 14th Amendment
The Due Process Clause received little immediate attention after the ratifi
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. Lower federal courts were the
first to interpret the newly minted Fourteenth Amendment. These lower federal
courts usually did not distinguish between the Due Process Clause and the

25

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

See Curtis, supra note 2, at 57–91; Aynes, supra note 2, at 629–32; Lawrence, supra note
2, at 41–50; Newsom, supra note 2, at 686; Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1051, 1055–60.
26

27

See Barnett supra note 4, at 207–08.

Scholars have argued that the Court should take the opportunity to apply the Bill of Rights
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Lawrence, supra note 2, at 41–50; Wildenthal,
supra note 2, at 1051, 1055–60.
28

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2013

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 13 [2013], No. 1, Art. 5

158

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 13

Privileges or Immunities Clause, and to the extent that they did, these courts
usually identified the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the primary vehicle to
apply rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights as limits upon the states.29
Many of these cases were brought under the Enforcement Act, which Congress
passed in 1870. The Enforcement Act of 1870 re-enacted the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866, enabling citizens to enforce their constitutional rights in federal court.
Among other things, the Enforcement Act protected blacks’ rights to vote, serve
on juries, hold office, and receive equal protection of the laws.30 Even though
the Enforcement Act protected rights “secured” by the Constitution from state
infringement, the lower courts found it challenging to determine which rights
were actually protected against state regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Enforcement Act.31 While some courts ruled broadly that all enumerated
rights in the Constitution and Bill of Rights were granted protection,32 others
found certain enumerated rights were not “secured” by the Constitution and,
thus, not protected by the Enforcement Act.33
The earliest case to indicate that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the
substantive protections of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment was the lower federal court decision of United States v. Hall. 34 In
Hall, the defendants challenged their indictment for obstructing others’ freedoms
of speech and assembly. Judge (and future Supreme Court Justice) Woods 35 ruled
the indictment was valid, that Congress had the power to pass the Enforcement
Act against state legislation, and the “right of freedom of speech, and the other
rights enumerated in the first eight articles of the amendment to the constitution”
were privileges and immunities of citizenship protected against state and
federal infringement.36 Woods made little reference to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and skipped over this clause in his analysis of

29
See generally United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282);
United States v. Mall, 26 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,712); United States v. Crosby,
25 F. Cas. 701 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (No. 14,893).
30

Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144.

See Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal
Courts, Department of Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876 128–32 (Oceana Publ’ns 1985);
Darrel A. H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the History of Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 77 Fordham L. Rev. 999, 1011–12 (2008).
31

32

Hall, 26 F. Cas. at 81; Mall, 26 F. Cas. at 1147.

33

Crosby, 25 F. Cas. at 704; United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. 251 (1871).

34

26 F. Cas. at 79.

Justice Woods joined the Supreme Court on December 15, 1880. He was nominated by
Rutherford B. Hayes and served until his death in 1887. Melvin I. Urofsky, The Supreme Court
Justices: A Biographical Dictionary 539 (1994).
35

36

Hall, 26 F. Cas. at 82.
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the Fourteenth Amendment.37 Woods argued that the right not to be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and other “privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States” are not only protected from
congressional impairment, but also that “the states are forbidden to impair them
by the fourteenth amendment.”38 Woods’s analytical neglect of the Due Process
Clause suggests he saw little difference between the Due Process Clause and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
A similar case decided in the same district, United States v. Mall, held
that Congress could not abridge the freedom of speech by virtue of the First
Amendment, and the states could not abridge this freedom by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment.39 The court’s verbiage demonstrates that the early courts
did not automatically apply the Bill of Rights to the states as modern parlance
characterizes it but, rather, determined enumerated rights were privileges or
immunities of citizenship “secured by the constitution” against state impairment
by the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, subject to enforcement in federal court
under the Enforcement Act.40
An Ohio Supreme Court decision made explicit what Hall and Mall
suggested about the Privileges or Immunities Clause, holding that it only covered
enumerated rights. When confronted with the constitutional validity of school
segregation, the Ohio Supreme Court found that even though the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment was not “judicially settled,” the language of the
amendment “includes only such privileges or immunities as are derived from, or
recognized by, the constitution of the United States. A broader interpretation . . .
[was] never contemplated . . . .”41 The Ohio court drew a distinction between the
rights enumerated in the federal Constitution and the right to attend a public
school, which was “derived solely from the constitution and laws of the State.”42
Arguing that a series of enumerated constitutional rights were protected from state
infringement, the Ohio court determined the Fourteenth Amendment did not
apply to state restrictions segregating education.43 The court made no mention of
how the Due Process Clause differed from the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

37

Id. at 81.

Id. at 80–81. Woods continued: “Before the fourteenth amendment, congress could not
impair [the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States], but the states might. Since
the fourteenth amendment, the bulwarks about these rights have been strengthened, and now the
states are positively inhibited from impairing or abridging them . . . .” Id. at 81.
38

39

26 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,712).

40

Id.

41

State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 209–10 (1871).

42

Id. at 210.

43

Id. at 209–11.
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It is possible, given the prevailing notion that the Fourteenth Amendment as a
whole protected rights enumerated in the Constitution, that the state court did
not see a need to distinguish between the two clauses.
Lower federal judges and prosecutors were also unsure how far the Fourteenth
Amendment reached.44 In an interesting work, Robert Kaczorowski demonstrates
that prosecutors and judges sometimes read the Fourteenth Amendment as
applying the Bill of Rights to the states.45 For example, in 1871, the U.S. Attorney
General brought two enforcement actions in federal court that turned on rights
protected by the Bill of Rights. In the first, United States v. Crosby, the right at issue
was the Fourth Amendment right to be protected from an unreasonable search.46
The court avoided the issue of whether the right was covered by the Enforcement
Act and protected against state infringement. To escape holding that the right
was secured by the Constitution, the court curiously reasoned that the right to
be secure in one’s own house was not derived from the Constitution because
it existed before the Constitution.47 Because the Constitution declared but did
not grant this pre-existing right, the Court found the right was not “secured”
under the Constitution and thus neither the Enforcement Act nor the Fourteenth
Amendment bound the states to the Fourth Amendment.48 Shortly after Crosby,
in United States v. Mitchel, the Attorney General again argued to the court that
the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states.49 Following
the court’s strange reasoning in Crosby, the Attorney General argued the Second
Amendment should be considered secured by the Constitution because the right
to bear arms did not exist at common law and only existed through its enumeration
in the Constitution.50 The court decided the Second Amendment violation could
be enforced through the Enforcement Act, but because another judge disagreed,
the case was certified for review in the Supreme Court.51 The Supreme Court
did not overturn the decision but dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds.52
Kaczorowski concludes that despite uncertainty about whether the Bill of Rights

44

Curtis, supra note 2, at 172; Kaczorowski, supra note 31, at 128.

45

Kaczorowski, supra note 31, at 128–32.

46

See 25 F. Cas. 701, 704 (C.C.D.S.C. 1871) (No. 14,893).

47

Id. at 704.

Id. (“The article in the constitution of the United States, to enforce which this count is
supposed to be drawn, has long been decided to be a mere restriction upon the United States itself.
The right to be secure in one’s house is not a right derived from the constitution, but it existed long
before the adoption of the constitution, at common law, and cannot be said to come within the
meaning of the words of the act ‘right, privilege, or immunity granted or secured by the constitution
of the United States.’”).
48

49

Kaczorowski, supra note 31, at 129.

50

Id. at 129 (discussing United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. 251, 252 (1871)).

51

Id. at 129–30.

52

Avery, 80 U.S. at 253.
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limited the states, “federal legal officers and judges consistently upheld broad
civil rights enforcement authority through 1872. Up through that year, only two
District Judges had declared any of the civil rights acts unconstitutional.” 53
Although these cases consistently show the Privileges or Immunities Clause
was generally understood as the most obvious clause through which to apply
enumerated rights to the states, none of the lower court opinions divested the Due
Process Clause of substantive protections. Rather, the arguments presented in the
lower courts and the decisions rendered by these courts centered on the Fourteenth
Amendment as a whole.54 This failure to distinguish the Due Process Clause from
the Privileges or Immunities Clause suggests the early courts believed the clauses
worked in tandem to apply enumerated rights in the federal Constitution to the
states. There was no reason to separate the meanings of the clauses because judges
and prosecutors thought each afforded the same protections.55 Judge Woods’s
analysis in Hall demonstrates that he believed due process was in and of itself
a privilege or immunity of citizenship and, because of this belief, the significant
overlap between the Due Process and Privileges or Immunities Clauses did not
concern him. The application of the Bill of Rights to the states simply seemed a
natural and logical outcome of the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Due Process in Slaughter-House: Original Substantive Meaning
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment in
the notorious Slaughter-House Cases in 1873.56 In Slaughter-House, the state
of Louisiana had granted a specific slaughterhouse company a monopoly to
slaughter animals in the city of New Orleans.57 The state-granted monopoly
ensured no other slaughterhouse could operate in another location in the city.58
Louisiana claimed the monopoly was a health and safety measure, but the other
slaughterhouse companies filed suit in state court arguing the law violated the
newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment by divesting them of their right to labor as
a privilege or immunity of citizenship.59 In a five-to-four decision, the Court ruled

53

Kaczorowski, supra note 31, at 131.

In describing these early cases, both Kaczorowski and Curtis (a renowned scholar on
Fourteenth Amendment history) also fail to distinguish between the Privilege or Immunities or
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Curtis, supra note 2 passim; Kaczorowski,
supra note 31 passim.
54

See United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282); Curtis,
supra note 2 passim.
55

56

83 U.S. 36 (1873).

57

Id. at 59–60.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 57–59, 61–62.
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that the law did not violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause because it dealt
with a right of state citizenship rather than national citizenship and the clause
protected only the rights of national citizenship.60
The Slaughter-House Cases are conventionally known for eviscerating the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 Little attention,
however, is given to the Supreme Court’s first treatment of the Due Process Clause
and its role in limiting state powers. This treatment is significant because Justice
Miller’s majority opinion and the dissenting opinions of Justices Swayne, Field,
and Bradley illustrate more clearly the subtle distinction between the two clauses,
which the earlier lower court cases largely ignored. The Slaughter-House opinions
imply that while the Privileges or Immunities Clause was thought to be the main
vehicle for protecting individual rights, the Due Process Clause was thought to
offer a residual protection for these rights, perhaps the last line of defense against
improper state infringement.
Justice Swayne’s dissenting opinion, although often overlooked, offers the
most explicit characterization of due process as a residual protection distinct from
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In the Due Process Clause, Swayne explained,
“to prevent, as far may be, the possibility of misinterpretation . . . the phrases
‘citizens of the United States’ and ‘privileges and immunities’ are dropped, and
more simple and comprehensive terms are substituted.” 62 Swayne conceptualized
due process as a second line of defense to protect against misinterpretations of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause by adding the more comprehensive terms
of “life,” “liberty,” and “property.” To Swayne, the question of whether the act
abridged the privileges or immunities of citizenship and the question of whether
the act deprived persons of liberty or property without due process of law were
distinct.63 Swayne’s astute distinction implies that if the Privileges or Immunities
Clause were misinterpreted and did not protect a fundamental right from state
infringement, then the Due Process Clause could serve that function through its
comprehensive protection of life, liberty, and property.
Justice Miller’s majority opinion also treated the Privileges or Immunities
and Due Process Clauses as separate protections, perhaps implying the residual
protection of the Due Process Clause, which Swayne made explicit (although,
unlike Swayne, Miller found neither clause invalidated the state-created
monopoly).64 After explaining away the Privileges or Immunities Clause as only

60

Id. at 78–79.

61

See supra note 2 (collecting sources).

62

Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 127 (Swayne, J., dissenting).

63

Id. at 128.

64

Id. at 64–66 (majority opinion).
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protecting rights of national citizenship from state infringement, Miller turned to
the residual protection of the Due Process Clause. He summarily rejected the idea
that due process had been infringed, stating:
The argument has not been much pressed in these cases that
the defendant’s charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property
without due process of law, or that it denies to them the equal
protection of the law. . . . And it is sufficient to say that under
no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any
that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State
of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of
New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property within the
meaning of that provision.65
Because Miller rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the monopoly deprived
them of their property without due process of law with little explanation, some
scholars have concluded Miller regarded due process as “exclusively procedural” 66
and argued Miller did not intend due process to play a role in applying the
enumerated rights in the Constitution to the states.67 This misreads Miller’s
opinion. Miller found the monopoly was not a deprivation of property because it
was a valid exercise of state police power.68 But by holding that the police power
was a reasonable exercise of legislative power, Miller implicitly recognized the
power of the Supreme Court to review police power regulations for reasonableness
under the due process clause. Whereas the majority found the monopoly to be
a reasonable exercise of state power, the dissenters, especially Field, argued that
the monopoly was unreasonable.69 The distinction is important for our purposes
because the majority did not indicate that the Court lacked the power to strike
down the legislation; the Court merely held the legislation was a reasonable
exercise of the police power and thus found no need to strike it down.
Miller did not characterize the Due Process Clause as exclusively procedural.
He suggested the concept of due process was important in both the federal and
state settings, giving weight to the Due Process Clause by explaining that the

65

Id. at 80–81.

Chester James Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law 99–100 (West Group 2d
ed. 1997) (“Thus the majority apparently assumed due process meant due procedure, that it
was a guarantee of a fair trial, not an inclusive guarantee of the substantive right to hold and
enjoy property.”).
66

67
For interesting argument that Miller saw “national rights” as the Bill of Rights, see Newsom,
supra note 2.
68
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 63 (“The regulation of the place and manner of conducting the
slaughtering of animals . . . and the inspection of the animals to be killed for meat. . . are among the
most necessary and frequent exercises of this power.”).
69

Id. at 101–02 (Field, J., dissenting).
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Fifth Amendment had been a restraint on federal power since the adoption of the
Constitution and noting that nearly all of the states had a due process clause in
their constitutions.70 Miller’s concern that both the state and federal governments
had due process provisions indicates the value the Court and the states saw in due
process generally. Miller acknowledged the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause “has practically been the same as it now is during the existence of the
government, except so far as the present amendment may place the restraining
power over the States in this matter in the hands of the Federal Government.” 71
Thus, Miller reiterated the Supreme Court has judicial power to define the
meaning of the Due Process Clause and the limitations it places on the states.72
Miller’s treatment of the Due Process Clause, unlike his treatment of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, left open the question whether the Due Process Clause
imposed substantive limits on state power.
Justice Field’s dissenting opinion dwelled on neither the Due Process Clause
nor the issue of whether the Bill of Rights applied to the states. Rather, Field
used broad language that implied a substantive due process analysis, finding the
monopoly was unreasonable because monopolies “encroach upon the liberty of
citizens to acquire property and pursue happiness, and were held void at common
law.”73 Field’s opinion deviated from the suggestion of the lower federal court
cases that the only rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were rights
enumerated in the Constitution. Field did not rely on positive law but, rather,
on the natural liberty interest of the people to engage in the “sacred right of
labor” which is a characteristic of “all free governments.”74 Field’s characteristics
of “all free governments” included, presumably, the Bill of Rights and anything
else that is necessary to liberty. Field recognized that no enumerated right protects
against monopolies:
[Monopolies are] opposed to the whole theory of free government,
and it requires no aid from any bill of rights to render them
void. That only is a free government, in the American sense of
the term, under which the inalienable right of every citizen to
pursue his happiness is unrestrained, except by just, equal, and
impartial laws.75

70

Id. at 80 (majority opinion).

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 101–102 (Field, J., dissenting).

74

See id. at 106.

75

Id. at 111.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol13/iss1/5

14

Banta: Substantive Due Process in Exile: The Supreme Court's Original In

2013

Substantive Due Process in Exile

165

This language is strikingly similar to the text of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.76 To Field, no Bill of Rights was needed to protect these liberty
interests because they inhered in the American concept of freedom. Although not
explicitly, Field suggests the concept of due process acted as the ultimate restraint
on improper infringement of liberty.
Justice Bradley echoed Justice Field but implied a textual basis for a
substantive due process right against monopoly. Bradley boldly proclaimed the
“rights to life, liberty and property . . . are the fundamental rights which can
only be taken away by due process of law, and which can only be interfered
with . . . by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good of all.” 77
According to Bradley, fundamental rights are thus protected by “due process of
law” and by a reasonable application of “lawful regulations.” In other words, if
a police power regulation is beyond the authority of the state to enact (that is,
if it is unlawful) or is unreasonable or arbitrary (that is, if it is not necessary or
proper) then it does not accord with the protections of “due process of law.”
Because Bradley found the state-created monopoly improperly deprived people
of both liberty and property, he believed the Court had the power to strike it
down.78 Like Field, Bradley acknowledged, “even if the Constitution were silent,
the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens . . . would be no less real
and no less inviolable than they now are.” 79 Bradley’s interpretation of the Due
Process Clause presupposed a broad power of federal oversight protecting both
enumerated and unenumerated rights that are elements of liberty. Under his
interpretation, the Due Process Clause worked with the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to ensure no right, immunity, privilege, liberty, property, or life is taken by
the states improperly, unreasonably, or arbitrarily.
Thus, while the earliest lower court decisions failed to distinguish the
Privileges or Immunities Clause from the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court
Justices, to varying degrees, distinguished the two clauses from the outset. Justice
Miller applied a different analysis to each of the clauses, reserving a broad judicial
power to continue to define due process even as he limited judicial power to
define privileges or immunities. The dissenters argued for a Due Process Clause
that would apply more than just the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights to

76
U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
77

Slaughter-House, 83 U.S at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).

78

See id. at 122.

79

Id. at 119.
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the states.80 The lower courts, the Slaughter-House majority, and the SlaughterHouse dissenters left open the possibility of using the Due Process Clause to define
unenumerated substantive rights in later cases.

III. The Court’s Circuitous Path to Substantive Due Process
Although Slaughter-House left the door open for the Court to apply pro
tections of the Bill of Rights against the states through the Due Process Clause,
for twenty years the Court did not wield the power of the Due Process Clause.
After Slaughter-House, the question became whether the rights listed in the Bill
of Rights would be applicable to the states as elements of due process, since they
were not privileges or immunities of national citizenship. The early cases gave a
resoundingly negative answer. Again and again, the Supreme Court declined to
interpret the rights and other protections listed in the Bill of Rights as elements of
due process. In doing so, however, the Court consistently used language pointing
to a broad substantive conception of due process, a conception the Court would
eventually use to apply both enumerated and unenumerated rights against the
states. Thus, while substantive due process remained in exile throughout the
late nineteenth century, the Court continually paved the way for its return.
In 1897, the Court invited this return by applying the takings clause of the
Fifth Amendment to a state regulation through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

A. The Early Understanding of the Application of the Due Process Clause
to the States
For several years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court did not consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment or the Due Process
Clause changed the longstanding precedent articulated in Barron that the Bill of
Rights did not apply to the states.81 Despite evidence from the ratification debates
that the framers intended to overrule Barron and evidence that many lower courts
believed the Fourteenth Amendment overruled Barron, the Court ignored other
courts’ nascent understanding of the change in law and reverted to the antebellum understanding.82

80
For an interesting originalist argument, see Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1112 (“The
primary difficulty with total incorporation from the standpoint of the original understanding lies
not in supporting it, but in limiting it to the Bill of Rights.”).
81
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (holding unanimously that the
first ten amendments “contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State
governments. This court cannot so apply them”).
82

Curtis, supra note 2, at 145–53.
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In Twitchel v. Pennsylvania, decided just five months after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff argued that he was convicted of murder
and sentenced to hanging in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.83 The
Pennsylvania statute at issue allowed an indictment of murder to be issued without
a description of “the manner in which, or the means by which the death of the
deceased was caused.”84 The plaintiff argued the statute directly conflicted with the
Sixth Amendment, which required the accused to be “informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.” 85 Although the Fourteenth Amendment had
been ratified several months earlier, expressly stating that “[n]o state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens . . .
nor . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,” 86 the Court remarkably held that application of the Bill of Rights to the
states was not an open question.87 Even more remarkable, the Court expressed its
dissatisfaction with the precedent and stated it would at least be compelled to hear
argument on the issue if Barron did not apply:
We are by no means prepared to say, that if it were an open
question whether the 5th and 6th Amendments of the
Constitution apply to the state governments, it would not be
our duty to allow the writ applied for and hear argument on the
question of repugnancy. We think, indeed, that it would. But
the scope and application of these amendments are no longer
subjects of discussion here.88
The Court’s rather drastic oversight on this issue, however, might be explained by
the fact that counsel did not argue that the Fourteenth Amendment changed the
holding of Barron.89
Similarly, in Edwards v. Elliott the Court summarily dismissed an argument
that a state law denying a right to a trial by jury was in conflict with the federal
Constitution without engaging in any Fourteenth Amendment analysis. 90 The
Court, without further explanation, cited Barron and other antebellum cases for
the proposition, finding “[the Seventh Amendment] does not apply to trials in
State courts.”91
83

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 321 (1868).

84

Id. at 325.

85

Id.

86

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

87

Twitchell, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 325.

88

Id.

89

Curtis, supra note 2, at 174.

90

88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874).

91

Id. at 557.
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Although it might be argued that the Court’s decisions in Twitchell and
Edwards demonstrate the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment
or the Due Process Clause did not encompass the power to apply rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights or unenumerated rights to the States, there are
two factors cutting against that conclusion. First, the Court never expressly held
the Fourteenth Amendment did not overrule Barron; the Court simply ignored
the Fourteenth Amendment’s potential impact on Barron. Twitchell and Edwards
alone do not foreclose the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment, and
especially the Due Process Clause, applied enumerated or unenumerated rights
to the states. Second, later cases demonstrate the issue of whether due process
applied protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the states was continuously
presented to the Court. Petitioners to the Court, at least, did not believe the
issue resolved.

B. The Exile of Due Process Procedural Protections
From the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to 1897, the Court
declined to apply procedural protections in the Bill of Rights to the states through
the Due Process Clause. The Court maintained each state had the authority to
determine procedural protections for its criminals. Yet, even as the Court refused
to define specific procedures making up due process guaranteed in the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court used broad language to reserve its power to determine
whether state procedures accorded with the Constitution. In cases questioning
whether the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights applied to the states, the
Court consistently issued the same amorphous holdings; the Court distinguished
between the states’ power to determine specific procedures that due process
supplies and the Court’s power to ultimately determine whether such procedures
conflicted with the Constitution. The Court’s refusal to define specific procedures
protected by the Due Process Clause allowed the Court to preserve broad power
to determine, in later years, whether a state procedure was constitutional under
the Due Process Clause.
For example, in Walker v. Sauvinet, the Court rejected the argument that
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is a component of due process
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.92 The Court found the
requirement of due process of law is met if “the trial is had according to the settled
course of judicial proceedings.” 93 In other words, laws of the state controlled what
process was afforded to defendants. But the Court also recognized its own power
under the Due Process Clause: “Our power over that law is only to determine
whether it is in conflict with the supreme law of the land, that is to say, with the

92

See 92 U.S. 90, 92–93 (1876).

93

Id. at 93.
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Constitution and laws of the United States.” 94 Even though the Court denied
itself the power to define the specifics of due process, it left open a significant
power to determine whether state law accords with the Constitution and laws of
the United States. The ambiguity of this distinction suggests the Court reserved
some power under the Due Process Clause to determine whether the procedural
law of the state violated the Constitution.
Likewise, in Kennard v. Louisiana, the Court refused to correct errors in
the state proceeding or to find that the errors violated due process.95 The Court
held, “[i]rregularities and mere errors in the proceedings can only be corrected
in the State courts.”96 The Court again declined to dictate specific elements of
due process. Rather, the Court framed the issue as whether the law of the state
was consistent with a broader conception of federal constitutional protection:
“[T]he question before us is, not whether the courts below . . . have followed
the law, but whether the law, if followed, would have furnished Kennard the
protections guaranteed by the Constitution.” 97 The Court’s refusal to define the
specifics of due process does not negate the other expression of broad authority
for the Court to determine whether the law, if followed, ultimately accorded with
the Constitution.
In Walker and Kennard, the Court affirmed its power under the Due Process
Clause to strike down state laws that infringed on certain protections guaranteed
by the Constitution. The Court seemingly relied on its earlier holdings in Barron,
Twitchel, and Edwards to maintain that the “Constitution” in this sense did not
include the Bill of Rights. Thus, in Walker, the Court declined to apply the
Seventh Amendment to the states via the Due Process Clause. But Walker and
Kennard left an obvious question unanswered: what rights did the Court consider
protected by the Due Process Clause? By leaving this question unanswered, the
Court prevented the Due Process Clause from suffering the same fate as the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. In Slaughter-House, Justice Miller enumerated
the privileges and immunities of national (as opposed to state) citizenship as
the protections of the Constitution: the right to habeas corpus, the right to be
protected on the high seas, and the right to go to the seat of government.98 Of
course, states almost never infringe these specific national rights, and the Court
has not needed to consider whether the Due Process Clause would allow the
Court to strike down state infringements of these national rights because they are
already protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Notice, however, that

94

Id.

95

See 92 U.S. 480, 481 (1875).

96

Id. at 481.

97

Id. at 481.

98

Slaughter-House Cases, 83. U.S. 36, 79–81 (1873).
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these specific enumerations of national rights under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause have limited the effect of the clause in later cases. By not defining specific
procedures protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court preserved the clause’s
jurisprudential power. The Due Process Clause gave the Court the substantive
power to apply provisions of the Constitution to the states, but the Court withheld
the protections in the Bill of Rights from that power because it felt bound to
follow Barron. Yet, even under this positivist interpretation, the Court had the
ultimate power over the law of the state, if not the specifics of the proceeding.
The Court’s reference to whether state law accords with the Constitution in
Walker and Kennard could also trace back to common law precedents that protected against unjust or arbitrary actions because such an act could not be
considered a law. This distinction between a state’s power over the judicial
proceedings and the Supreme Court’s power over the law of the state echoes
Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, where he explained: “An ACT of the
Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the
social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” 99
The Court’s insistence in Walker and Kennard that it had power to determine
whether the state law accorded with the Constitution may have referred to a
general grant of power under the Due Process Clause to protect against any state
action, whether there is an enumerated right or not, that violates the ultimate
protections of law.100 Yet, as cases continued to come before the Supreme Court
with plaintiffs claiming procedural protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
the Court became more and more adamant about its circular reasoning that the
state must determine proper procedure and the federal courts could not interfere
unless the state law violated due process of law under the Constitution. From the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to 1897, the Court never found that a
state law deprived a person of due process of law, and it seemed the Court granted
the states a strong presumption that their judicial proceedings would meet the
constitutional standard of due process.
In emptying the Due Process Clause of its procedural content by refusing to
use it to protect basic procedures enumerated in the Bill of Rights against state
infringement, the Court reaffirmed an amorphous substantive content to due
process. For example in Missouri v. Lewis, Justice Bradley (a champion of the
substantive interpretation of due process in Slaughter-House) avoided discussing
due process when a plaintiff challenged specific procedural elements in the
state’s administration of appeals.101 The court system in Missouri allowed direct
99

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 386–87 (1798).

See Gedicks, supra note 13, at 661 (arguing that the terms “law,” “due process of law,” and
“law of the land” in the Fifth Amendment context were used during the revolutionary period to be
“general, ‘catch-all’ phrases, prohibiting arbitrary or otherwise unjust legislation designed to protect
the residuum of liberty exemplified by natural and customary fundamental rights”).
100

101

101 U.S. 22, 31–32 (1880).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol13/iss1/5

20

Banta: Substantive Due Process in Exile: The Supreme Court's Original In

2013

Substantive Due Process in Exile

171

claims to the highest court in some counties and a special court of appeals in
other counties.102 The plaintiff claimed a violation of the equal protection of law
guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Mimicking Judge Taney’s analysis
in Dred Scott 103 but reaching the opposite conclusion, Bradley stated, “[g]reat
diversities in these respects may exist in two States separated only by an imaginary
line. On one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other
side no such right. Each State prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding.” 104
While in his Slaughter-House dissent Bradley had extolled the virtues of the
Due Process Clause in protecting liberty and property, in Lewis he found the Due
Process Clause did not prevent denial of a jury trial in one place as opposed to
another within the same state on the sole justification of a jurisdictional line. This
does not indicate, however, that Bradley or the Court thought the Due Process
Clause was empty of meaning; rather, the Due Process Clause protected more
than merely the procedure as defined in the Bill of Rights. Bradley stated:
It is the right of every State to establish such courts as it sees fit,
and to prescribe their several jurisdictions as to territorial extent,
subject-matter, and amount, and the finality and effect of their
decisions, provided it does . . . not deprive any person of his
rights without due process of law . . . .105
In other words, the Court determined that due process of law limited the states
but again declined to define due process of law. The Court simultaneously held
that a jury trial is not an element of due process and that the states could not
deprive any person of due process of law, indicating that due process of law
apparently encompassed unenumerated, unnamed protections beyond the
Seventh Amendment.
Four years later, the Court in Hurtado v. California explicitly held that a
grand jury proceeding was not a necessary element of due process.106 The Court
followed a familiar pattern. In declaring that this right was not mandated by the
Due Process Clause, the Court gave an expansive view of due process, describing
102

Id. at 29.

103

See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

Lewis, 101 U.S. at 31. Justice Taney had used the following idea to support the substantive
nature of the Due Process Clause in Dred Scott:
104

The fifth amendment to the constitution . . . provides that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. And an act of Congress which
deprives a citizen of the United States his liberty or property, merely because he came
himself or brought his property into a particular territory of the United States, and
who had committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the
name of due process of law.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
105

Lewis, 101 U.S. at 30.

106

See 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
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the history of due process in English and American law and concluding that
such protections served as “bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation; but in
that application, as it would be incongruous to measure and restrict them by
the ancient customary English law, they must be held to guaranty, not particular
forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and
property.”107 The Court acknowledged the substance of individual rights would
change with time, and that evolving notions of what constituted the public good
could become part of due process. It stated:
It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the
discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the general
public good, which regards and preserves these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.108
Even though the Court did not use this expansive view to invalidate the legislation
before it, it kept the option open to use the Due Process Clause to protect
substantive rights.
The Court’s expansive definition of due process in theory, but its narrow
application of due process in practice, came with a high price. Hiding behind
the more substantive but amorphous definition of due process while denying
procedural rights, the Court abdicated a fundamental and obvious protection
of the Due Process Clause: impartial judicial process. In Ex Parte Spies,109 the
Court was confronted once again with the argument that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and the Due Process Clause applied the protections of the
Bill of Rights to the states.110 The defendants were charged with conspiracy to
commit murder after someone threw a bomb into a large crowd of protestors in a
public square.111 Although there was little evidence the defendants were involved
in any conspiracy to murder, the defendants were convicted by a biased jury and
irrelevant evidence.112
The defendants claimed numerous violations of protections in the Bill of
Rights, most importantly their Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial

107

Id. at 532 (emphasis added).

108

Id. at 537.

109

123 U.S. 131 (1887).

110

Id.

See infra Part IV.B (further explaining this event, known as the “Haymarket Affair”). See
also Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1484.
111

112

Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1485.
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jury.113 The Court again avoided deciding whether the Fourteenth Amendment
applied the Bill of Rights to the states, and instead held that even if it did, the
state had not violated Bill of Rights guarantees in the defendants’ trial.114 The
defendants were executed.115 It is significant that the Court found the state had
granted the defendants an impartial jury instead of holding that an impartial
jury was not an element of due process. In doing so, the Court suggested an
impartial jury could be an element of due process but held there was no need to
decide this because the state’s process was impartial. This case is one of the most
blatant displays of the Supreme Court refusing to give the Due Process Clause
any real meaning in the face of an unfair and biased proceeding, but the Court
nevertheless managed to preserve the theoretical protection of the Due Process
Clause by not explicitly ruling on its substantive content.

C. The Exile of Due Process Substantive Protections
In denying multiple procedural aspects of due process, the Court reserved
a concept of due process that had the potential to be a much more powerful
guarantor of fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. Unfortunately, the Court
also declined to protect the more substantive rights in the Bill of Rights in United
States v. Cruikshank.116 Just as the Court preserved the power of the Due Process
Clause in denying procedural protections, it preserved the power of the clause in
denying substantive protections. The Court articulated the broad stroke of the
Due Process Clause in finding that it could void state legislation if such legislation
was arbitrary or capricious. The power to void state legislation under the due
process standard of arbitrary or capricious would later be used by a more prepared
Court to prevent state infringement of the Bill of Rights.
Shortly after the Slaughter-House decision, in Cruikshank, the Court was
confronted by the question of whether the right to peaceably assemble and the
right to bear arms, both protected in the Bill of Rights, applied to the states.
The Court did not mention the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on these
rights but assumed, following the Slaughter-House decision, that these rights
were privileges and immunities protected only against infringement by the

Ex Parte Spies, 123 U.S at 133–40. They claimed they were denied the right to trial by
an impartial jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizures, the right to peaceable assembly, and the right to be informed of the nature of
the accusations.
113

114

Id. at 167–82. See also Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1491.

115

Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1485.

116

92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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national government.117 Instead of finding that the Due Process Clause added
rights, the Court found the clause “furnish[ed] an additional guaranty against
any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to
every citizen as a member of society” 118 and “secur[ed] the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.” 119 The Court, however, did not
find the First Amendment or the Second Amendment were guaranteed against
state power.120 And it did not reach the question of whether the legislation was “an
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.” 121 Instead, the Court found that
the massacre had been committed by private individuals and held the Fourteenth
Amendment only protected against state action. Thus, the private violation
of another’s First or Second Amendment rights was not a proper Fourteenth
Amendment claim and needed to be addressed by the state.122
Having defined due process as protection against arbitrary legislation,
the Court was hesitant to limit the power of the states under the standard of
arbitrariness. It also continued to avoid explicitly holding that the Bill of Rights
did not apply in any way to the states and, in fact, suggested the opposite.
The Court’s first concrete articulation that the Bill of Rights could limit a state’s
power occurred in In re Kemmler, in which the Court indicated the Due Process
Clause provided a substantive limit on a state’s ability to determine punishments
for state crimes.123 In re Kemmler involved a challenge to legislation that allowed
electrocution as a method of capital punishment.124 Similar to the avoidance

Id. at 552–553 (“The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or
duties of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the
protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. . . . The second amendment declares that it
shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed
by Congress.”).
117

Id. at 554. This also mimics the language in Slaughter-House indicating the view that the
Due Process Clause was a residual protection of rights.
118

Id. at 554 (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 235, 244 (1819))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
119

120
See id. at 552–53 (“The first amendment . . . was not intended to limit the powers of
the State governments . . . , but to operate upon the National government alone. . . . The second
amendment . . . means no more than that [the right to bear arms for a lawful purpose] shall not be
infringed by Congress.”).
121

Id.

Id. at 552–56 (“The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more than
the one which precedes it, and which we have just considered, add anything to the rights which one
citizen has under the Constitution against another.”).
122

123

136 U.S. 436, 446–47 (1890).

124

See id. at 438–44.
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tactics the Court used in Cruikshank, the Court determined electrocution was
not cruel and unusual and thus did not decide whether the Eighth Amendment
applied to the states. It suggested, however, that in some form the principle of
the Eighth Amendment could apply to the states as it did to Congress. The
Court found:
If the punishment prescribed for an offense against the laws of
the state were manifestly cruel and unusual as burning at the
stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like, it would be
the duty of the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the
constitutional prohibition. And we think this equally true to the
eighth amendment, in its application to Congress.125
The Court further elaborated on the Fourteenth Amendment, repeating the
doctrines established in previous cases: the protection of fundamental rights is
the responsibility of states; the Due Process Clause forbids arbitrary deprivations
of life, liberty, or property; and states have the power to protect the health, peace,
morals, education, and good order of society.126 Finally, the Court held the
execution legislation was “within the legitimate sphere of the legislative power of
the State, and in observance of those general rules prescribed by our systems of
jurisprudence . . . . We cannot perceive that the state has thereby . . . deprived him
of due process of law.”127
The Court’s focus on determining whether the state law was within the
legislative sphere of state power indicates the substantive reach of the Due Process
Clause. In In re Kemmler, if the enactment had not been within the legislative
sphere of the state (meaning it was not a valid police power regulation because
it was arbitrary and did not contribute to the peace or good of society) then the
Court apparently believed it would have had the power to strike the legislation
down and apply the Eighth Amendment protection to the states under the Due
Process Clause. In addition, In re Kemmler shows the Court saw substantive limits
in the Due Process Clause: If the punishment were too cruel, the Court could
strike it down whether it was state or congressional action.
On the whole, in regard to the Bill of Rights protections that are not exclusively
procedural, the Court continued to reaffirm the 1830 rule from Barron that the
Bill of Rights only restrained congressional power. Yet the cases discussing the
issue make the Court’s interpretation clear: the Due Process Clause could apply
as a substantive limit to state infringement of these rights. When substantive

125

Id. at 446–47.

126

Id. at 448–49.

127

Id. at 449.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2013

25

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 13 [2013], No. 1, Art. 5

176

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 13

rights were at issue, the Court affirmed the state legislation if the Court found
the legislation was reasonable and promoted the public welfare under the Due
Process Clause.
The fact that the Court avoided determining whether a specific substantive
protection in the Bill of Rights was a component of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment is significant. While denying its ability to define specific
procedural requirements, the Court affirmed its ability to protect substantive
rights against arbitrary legislation. Even though the Court always found the
legislation at issue reasonable in these cases, the Court did not foreclose its
opportunity of finding some other piece of legislation unreasonable in the future.
This open-ended analysis laid the groundwork for the Court to start finding state
infringements of the Bill of Rights unreasonable exercises of state legislative power
at the end of the nineteenth century.

D. Other Suggestions of the Due Process Clause Applying the Bill of Rights
to the States
After the cases denying procedural and substantive guarantees of the Bill of Rights
as part of due process, it seemed the Due Process Clause did not protect much. The
Court consistently affirmed a broad, if elusive, theory that the Due Process Clause
protected “due process,” 128 “fundamental rights,” 129 or “the Constitution,” 130
but the Court never exercised this power, leaving the Clause apparently empty
of practical meaning. Decision after decision either invoked the blanket rule
from Barron that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states or avoided the
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment changed this by ruling there was no
infringement on the Bill of Rights even assuming these rights applied to the states.
The Court’s repeated suggestion of a broad, flexible, substantive conception of the
Due Process Clause, however, sowed the seeds for Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
in 1897, the first explicit application of a provision of the Bill of Rights against
the states.131
Even though the Court’s decisions in cases like Ex Parte Spies and Cruikshank
were unanimous and seemed to deprive the Due Process Clause of any procedural
or substantive force in regards to provisions of the Bill of Rights, the original
dissenters in Slaughter-House maintained their strong substantive interpretations
of due process throughout the nineteenth century. In 1884, when an issue
similar to the state-created monopolies of Slaughter-House returned to the Court,

128

Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1880).

129

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).

130

Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876).

131

See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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Justices Bradley and Field concurred with the Court’s decision to uphold the state
legislation striking down the monopoly. Bradley and Field argued, however, that
repeal of the state monopoly did not deprive its beneficiaries of fundamental rights
because the monopoly originally deprived persons of property and liberty without
due process of law and was an unreasonable exercise of police power.132 Indeed,
as late as 1892, Field issued a dissenting opinion in O’Neil v. Vermont, in which
the Court found the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states and failed to
decide whether a fine of six-thousand dollars or a jail sentence of almost fifty-four
years was cruel and unusual for violating liquor laws.133 Field argued: “[S]o far
as [the first ten amendments] declare or recognize the rights of persons, they are
rights belonging to them as citizens of the United States under the Constitution;
and the Fourteenth Amendment . . . places a limit upon state power.” 134 Field,
however, used the Privileges or Immunities Clause in his analysis and was silent
about the role of the Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, Field showed in O’Neil
that his views about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the federal protection of fundamental rights had remained consistent since
Slaughter-House.
Another interesting innuendo from this period is the treatment of the
Fourteenth Amendment in state courts. In 1891, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia found the issue of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of
Rights to be unclear.135 Referencing the Second Amendment declaration of the
right to bear arms, the court explained: “Supposing this to be a restriction upon
legislation by the several states, as well as by the congress (a question upon which
authorities differ) we may still conclude that by law to regulate a conceded right
is not necessarily to infringe the same.” 136 The West Virginia state court upheld
the regulation without further discussion regarding the Fourteenth Amendment’s
application to the states.
Then, in 1897, the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause to apply the
Fifth Amendment takings prohibition against the states in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad had established a fixed railroad
compensation scheme that the Court found violated the takings clause, which it

132
Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 759 (1884) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (describing the
monopoly as an “arbitrary invasion by state authority of the rights of person and property”); id. at
757–58 (Field, J., dissenting ) (“In this country it has seldom been held, and never in so odious a
form as is here claimed, that an entire trade and business could be taken from citizens and vested
in a single corporation. Such legislation has been regarded everywhere else as inconsistent with
civil liberty.”).
133

144 U.S. 323, 325–27 (1892).

134

Id. at 363 (Field, J., dissenting).

135

State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367 (1891).

136

Id. at 372.
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held was applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause.137 While some
scholars call this decision an aberration or a “dramatic departure” 138 from the
Court’s established jurisprudence at the time, it can also be seen as the first instance
where the Court actually used the reservoir of substantive power under the Due
Process Clause to which it consistently alluded in its previous cases. Ironically, the
Court used the Due Process Clause not to protect the fundamental rights of all
persons (whether procedural or substantive) as it was arguably intended to do, but
rather the property rights of a railroad corporation. Nonetheless, the 1897 case
is a culmination of the rhetoric the Court had preserved for itself in Cruikshank,
Hurtado, In re Kemmler, Ex Parte Spies, and various other cases in which it refused
to invoke the Due Process Clause to protect select rights but reaffirmed the power
to do so if something more flagrantly arbitrary came along.

IV. Understanding the Court’s Motivations
What social, political, or theoretical motives the Court had for repeatedly
denying any protection under the Due Process Clause while simultaneously
encouraging the theory of substantive due process is a question equally interesting
as how the doctrine developed shortly after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There are several possible explanations for the Court’s exile of due
process. First, racism and the desire to end Reconstruction might have made the
Court less willing to apply due process protections to the plight of blacks but still
inclined to preserve due process for other purposes. Second, the Court might have
been reticent to enact bold social or political changes through the Due Process
Clause due to a pervading belief that the political and economic struggles of the day
posed a danger to the stability of the nation. Third, the Court struggled with huge
administrative burdens which could have influenced its desire to avoid creating
new causes of action under the Constitution while still preserving those causes of
action for the future. And lastly, emerging corporate interests co-opting the political
branches of the day might have given the Court the political support necessary to
use the reservoir of power preserved in the Court’s due process jurisprudence.

A. Racism and Reconstruction
Ten years of Reconstruction followed the Civil War, during which Northern
troops occupied the vanquished South and the nation ratified the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The Reconstruction

Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897)
(“In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute, whereby private
property is taken for the state or under its direction for public use, without compensation made or
secured to the owner, is upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by
the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States . . . .”).
137

138

Wildenthal, supra note 2, at 1502.
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period was a difficult time for both the North and the South, and the nation
desired to restore normalcy.139 When the Court decided Slaughter-House in 1873,
the nation was rapidly losing interest in the Reconstruction policies.140 The
nation’s focus had turned to solving economic problems. From 1873 to 1877, land
speculation and bank failures caused an economic crisis; three million workers
lost their jobs and thousands of farmers lost their farms.141 With President Hayes’s
promise to remove federal troops from the South, Reconstruction ended.142 As
Cruikshank signaled in 1876, the Court intended to end Reconstruction by
denying federal protection through the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause to blacks attempting to exercise their rights to peaceably assemble
and bear arms.143 The Court’s language in Cruikshank broadly conceptualized
due process, but the Court avoided asserting the protections of due process by
characterizing the violation as private rather than state action.144
Racism was undoubtedly a factor in cases where the defendants were
white and the victims were black. The Court reflected the national apathy of
the political and economic cost of enforcing federal protections in the South
and demonstrated hostility towards blacks in Cruikshank. Without a general
consensus, the Court was unwilling to protect blacks through the Fourteenth
Amendment.145 Despite the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to address the rights of newly emancipated slaves—even under Slaughter-House—
the racist sentiment was too much for the amendment to surmount. Curtis briefly
mentions the curious retreat by many Republican judges from their protection
of black liberties in the 1870s. He argues that while one reason could have been
concerns about federalism, another reason “may have been the conclusion that the
protection of blacks was not worth the enormous effort it required and the conflict
it produced.” 146
139

See John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the Civil War 189–211 (2d ed. 1994).

140

Peter Irons, A People’s History of the Supreme Court 201 (Penguin Books 1999).

Id. See also Thomas J. Schlereth, Victorian America: Transformations in Everyday Life
1876-1915 xiv (Richard Balkin ed., HarperPerennial 1991).
141

142
The Election of 1876 deadlocked between Tilden and Hayes. When the Senate and House
met together to settle the election, the Republican Party agreed to remove federal troops from
the South in exchange for Hayes’ election to the presidency. This political agreement was called
the Compromise of 1877. See David M. Kennedy, Lizabeth Cohen & Thomas A. Bailey, The
American Pageant: A History of the Republic 511 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 13th ed. 2006).

See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Peter Irons suggests that the
Court ignored the social repercussions of the Cruikshank decision because it was determined to end
Reconstruction. Even if the Court would have decided the case differently, Irons argues that “legal
recourse could not have prevailed in the climate of hostility toward blacks.” Irons, supra note 140,
at 204.
143

144

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 532.

See Irons, supra note 140, at 205 (“By 1876, the Supreme Court—and most northern
whites—had tired of Reconstruction battles and were ready to surrender to the former Confederates.
The reaction of southern whites to Waite’s opinion reflected their sense of impending victory.”).
145

146

Curtis, supra note 2, at 179.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2013

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 13 [2013], No. 1, Art. 5

180

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 13

Protecting blacks was not a popular policy in the late 1800s. With the
economic disasters that plagued the time period, politicians and judges were
unwilling to make advancements under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court,
however, most likely had no desire to limit its theoretical power under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ruling in favor of blacks could have cost the Court its
credibility, so it compromised. It ruled against blacks by side-stepping the real issue
of Fourteenth Amendment protection. In doing so, the Court exiled substantive
due process, reserving the protections for more sympathetic defendants, which
turned out to be corporations and businesses.147
The irony is that the Court expanded its power during Reconstruction
but failed to use its expanded power to apply the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states. While the Court repeatedly limited the Due Process
Clause by not applying it in actual holdings, the Court nevertheless expanded
its power and reach of judicial review during this time period, much like it
expanded its power under the Due Process Clause but failed to actually invoke
the power. All agreed after the Civil War that the Court had the power to review
the constitutionality of statutes; although the Dred Scott decision was heavily
criticized, scholars did not argue that the Court lacked the power of judicial
review.148 The Court had exercised the power of judicial review since Marbury
v. Madison in 1803, of course, but it began to use it more frequently after the
Civil War and began aggressively striking down congressional legislation. From
1865 to 1873, the Court voided ten congressional acts after invalidating only two
during the preceding sixty-six years.149 Most of these decisions, however, had no
practical effect on Reconstruction or the nation.150 Thus, even though the Court
was expanding its practical power through judicial review, its decisions changed
little constitutional jurisprudence and demonstrated its reticence to make bold
constitutional statements. Much like its articulation of the power under the
Due Process Clause, the Court demonstrated its power without applying it to a
significant degree and certainly without applying it to protect the rights of blacks
in the nation.

See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897).
147

148

Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 154 (1993).

Stanley Kutler, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics 6 (Univ. Chi. Press
1968). The two before the Civil War were Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
149

150
Schwartz, supra note 148, at 155. Schwartz argues that the only two cases to have any
practical effect on Reconstruction were Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), which
was overruled a year later, and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), which limited
an unknown statute. The other cases to strike down congressional action were Gordon v. United
States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865); Reichart v. Felps, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160 (1868); The Alicia, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 571 (1869); United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869); and United States v.
Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1873).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol13/iss1/5

30

Banta: Substantive Due Process in Exile: The Supreme Court's Original In

2013

Substantive Due Process in Exile

181

B. The Court’s Due Process Reticence in the Face of Turmoil
Although racism and a desire to end Reconstruction were factors in the denial
of due process in early cases after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
this explanation is incomplete. As we have seen, the Court routinely denied
due process in a whole array of cases regardless of the race or national origin of
the parties. Another explanation of the Court’s treatment of due process stems
from the Court’s reticence to impose social change during times of political
and economic upheaval. Many legal historical narratives jump from the end
of Reconstruction to the turn of the century and ignore the crucial events that
occurred in the last thirty years of the 1800s. These thirty years witnessed all kinds
of political and economic unrest. The Court’s due process reticence may well
have been a result of the turmoil that American society faced during this time.
In the face of political and economic upheavals, the Court apparently lacked the
political will and support to give application to the Due Process Clause. Perhaps
it feared inciting more turmoil during the difficult transition from an agrarian to
a manufacturing economy and chose not to be an instrument of social progress.
Known as the Gilded Age,151 the decades from 1870 to 1900 were a time of
rapid change that brought numerous growing pains. Between 1870 and 1900,
the nation’s population grew from thirty-eight to seventy-six million.152 The
Transcontinental Railroad connected the east and west coasts in 1869, and railways
throughout the nation transformed the U.S. economy into a truly national one.153
Racial conflict continued to be a problem. And with a million people immigrating
to America each year, new national origin conflicts began to occur.154 Many
of these immigrants were from countries other than English-speaking Britain.
Italians, Greeks, Slovaks, Poles, Chinese, Japanese, and Russians increasingly
entered the country. Many were poorer and less educated than immigrants who
had come before.155 The language barriers and fear of rising poverty levels resulted
in a rise of nativism. Anti-immigrant sentiment spread through the nation and
violent conflicts occurred over national origin and race.156

The Gilded Age received its name from Mark Twain in A Gilded Age: A Tale of Today. It was
intended as a sarcastic name for the three decades after the Civil War. Kennedy, Cohen & Bailey,
supra note 142, at 509.
151

Compare U.S. Census Bureau, Dep’t of Com., Report of the Superintendent of the Ninth
Census, at ix (1872), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1870a-02.
pdf, with U.S. Census Bureau, Dep’t of Com., Twelfth Census of the United States, Taken in
the Year 1900, vol. 1, ch. 1, at xviii (1901), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/
documents/33405927v1ch01.pdf.
152

153

Irons, supra note 140, at 217.

154

Schlereth, supra note 141, at 8–10.

155

Id. at 8–9.

156

Id. at 11. The Chinese Exclusion Acts are prime examples.
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Although racial and ethnic conflicts were a problem in national politics, the
struggles of the economy took center stage. The rapid growth of the economy as
America moved to an industrial economy had several drawbacks. The period was
marked by panics and depressions that triggered severe unemployment. From
1873–1879, 1882–1885, and 1893–1897, economic difficulties resulted in
twenty-three to thirty percent of industrial workers being unemployed for some
time during these years.157 Workers grew dissatisfied with long hours and low
wages.158 Harsh conditions and worker dissatisfaction led to periods in which
workers and employers engaged in violent conflicts.159 Riots and strikes were
common as political support for socialism increased and challenged the political
support for capitalism.160
During this transitional era, the Supreme Court displayed distinct reticence
in due process decisions that touched on racial, political, and economic issues.
With the economy in turmoil and troubling racial and labor conflicts around the
nation, the Court declined to use the Due Process Clause in a way that would
substantively shape national policy.
Ex Parte Spies is an excellent example. In one of the bloodiest labor conflicts
during this time, the “Haymarket Affair,” a bomb thrown into a crowd killed
seven police officers.161 Many workers demonstrating for eight-hour workdays
were also wounded or killed.162 Leaders of the demonstration were arrested and
tried for murder with little, if any, evidence of their connection to the bombing
or to a conspiracy to murder. The defendants appealed the conviction, arguing
that they were denied the right to trial by an impartial jury, the right against
self-incrimination, and the right against illegal searches and seizures.163 The
defendants argued that these rights were protected against state infringement by
the Fourteenth Amendment. When the case was brought before the Supreme
Court, the Court held that the state did not violate the Bill of Rights guarantees
in the defendants’ trials and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.164 This
ruling exemplified the Court’s fear of substantive due process rulings during
this tumultuous period, even in the face of obvious violations of procedural and
substantive rights. The Court apparently had no desire to appear as if it supported
anarchy. A swift ruling denying the protections of due process signaled that the
Court did not condone labor riots or strikes.
157

Id. at 34.

In 1889, for example, 22,000 railroad workers were injured or killed. Irons, supra note
140, at 217.
158

159

Schlereth, supra note 141, at xiv.

160

Id.

161

See Wildenthal, supra note 111, at 1484.

162

Irons, supra note 140, at 240.

163

See Ex Parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131, 165 (1887).

164

See id. at 167–82.
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Constant labor disputes in an emerging industrial economy generated
widespread fear of a second civil war and general anarchy.165 With the memory
of the Civil War still fresh, the fear of renewed armed conflict prompted an
expansion of national and state power to keep social peace and order. After a series
of particularly bloody railroad strikes in 1877, cities built armories and formed
standing home guards. Police forces and local militias expanded and asserted their
presence in the communities.166 Irons argues, “It is no exaggeration to describe the
battles of workers and employers of the 1870s and 1880s as class warfare, a struggle
waged both in the streets and voting booths.”167 The Court, apparently fearful
of anarchy caused by violent labor disputes, may have also doubted its practical
power to deploy the Due Process Clause in a substantive or even procedural way.
Instead of using the Due Process Clause in a practical way, the Court
repeatedly explained that due process could properly be used in certain situations
to limit a state from infringing on fundamental rights, but that the situations
at bar did not qualify.168 The Court may have doubted its power for another
reason, namely, the bitter legacy of the Dred Scott decision. In describing the
general jurisprudence of the Court during this time, Robert Fridlington observes:
“The Court was still haunted by the ghost of the disastrous Dred Scott decision,
which had severely damaged its influence and credibility. Chief Justice Taney’s
blatantly political opinion in the case had . . . tragically misjudged the limits of the
Court’s power to determine public policy.”169 Many agree that the infamous and
highly controversial Dred Scott decision had weakened and subdued the Supreme
Court in the years after the Civil War.170 Thus, along with the mass population
changes, labor disputes, and economic difficulties, the memory of Dred Scott
likely weakened the Court’s perception of its own power. The Court knew
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had constitutional
meaning, and defined due process protections in abstract terms, but refused to
apply those protections. By doing so, the Court avoided conflict with the political
and economic policies of the day. Through its due process reticence, the Court
underwrote national stability by following social and economic forces instead of
changing or re-directing them.
Even Justice Miller, who authored the majority opinion in the SlaughterHouse Cases, implied that the fear of national pressures influenced the Court. In
an address given at the University of Michigan on June 29, 1887, Miller declared
165
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that the Court “is, then, so far as the ordinary forms of power concerned, by far the
feeblest branch or department of Government. It must rely upon the confidence
and respect of the public for its just weight and influence.” 171 Miller explained
that because the Court lacked the power to enforce its rulings, to appropriate
funds for its maintenance, or to campaign for any kind of political constituency,
the Court’s true power came from the confidence of the American people. If
the people did not accept the Court’s opinions, it would lose its credibility and
ultimately its power to authoritatively interpret the Constitution. In this time
of labor and racial conflict, perhaps it was not realistic to expect the judiciary to
impose reform through application of the Due Process Clause. By using language
suggesting a powerful substantive interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the
Court attempted to preserve a reservoir of power for when the American people
would more readily accept the substantive meaning of due process defined by the
Court.172 Ultimately, the Court would first use this substantive power to protect
corporate interests at the turn of the century, suggesting the Court did not use the
power until it had outside political support for its decisions.173

C. Administrative Burdens
The Court’s exile of substantive due process also could have stemmed from
the Court’s heavy administrative burdens in the late 1800s. At that time, no
intermediate federal courts of appeals existed. The Supreme Court faced a full
docket, and the Justices continued to fulfill their circuit obligations.174 Thus, the
Court may have shied away from extending due process in specific instances to
avoid creating new constitutional claims and increasing an already over-burdened
docket, preserving substantive due process for the future without having to handle
the immediate consequences.175
171
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The Court had petitioned Congress for relief as early as 1872, but nothing
was done to alleviate the Court’s heavy workload until 1891, when Congress
created an intermediate court of appeals, determining that the Supreme Court
Justices no longer would ride circuit.176 Administrative changes to the Court could
have prompted the Court to use substantive power under the Due Process Clause.
Congress also enacted limitations on federal jurisdiction by raising the amount
in controversy and eliminating jurisdiction for certain corporations.177 The newly
established federal appellate courts took much of the workload off of the justices.
In response to a decreased workload and a decreased ability to define general
constitutional law, the Court invoked its ultimate authority to define federal law
through the Due Process Clause, authority it had preserved in dicta from 1870
to 1897.

D. The Court and Corporate Interests
As we have seen, the Court preserved the idea of due process while repeatedly
refusing to apply it in its cases. Most scholars attribute the rise of substantive
due process to emerging economic concerns and the liberty of contract.178 For
example, Professors Nowak and Rotunda have suggested that the emerging
economic concerns forced the Court to accept the dissenting Justices’ opinions
from Slaughter-House on substantive due process in the early twentieth century.179
But this broad idea of due process was not only present in the dissenting opinions;
as discussed above, majority opinions also referenced broad power under the Due
Process Clause. After preserving substantive due process in dicta, the Court’s use
of it in 1897 may partly be explained by emerging corporate political power in an
unstable, fledgling economy.
As discussed above, the labor disputes in the late 1800s caused fear and
unrest in American society. Farmers were especially active in trying to obtain
political relief from corporations charging high rates to ship farmed goods.
Powerful corporations involved in running the railroads and grain elevators
enjoyed monopolies and in many cases bribed state legislators to allow monopoly
pricing to continue.180 Railroad and grain elevator corporations forced farmers
to pay exorbitant prices to store and ship their products.181 In response, farmers
joined together in the Granger Movement to petition the state legislatures to set
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maximum rates for rail shipping and grain elevator storage.182 Railroads and grain
storage corporations were accustomed to protection from state legislatures, but
with this counter lobbying, the corporations turned to the courts for protection,
arguing that these pricing laws violated their property rights.183 When the Court
first upheld a state regulation of prices in Munn v. Illinois,184 railroad strikes ensued
as railroads decreased workers’ already low wages to compensate for the price
regulations.185 The corporations changed their tactics when the states began to
pass legislation contrary to their interests—corporations stopped investing money
in those states.186 Charles Warren described this phenomenon:
[A] more powerful force than that of the Courts was working to
protect the railroads—the investors and the public. . . . [T]he
farmers found themselves compelled to allow the railroads a fair
profit. Consequently, the very men who had been most active in
passing rate laws . . . were the readiest to repeal them.187
For years, scholars have postulated that the Court was influenced by the
dominant intellectual theory of the day—laissez faire. Scholars have argued that
the popularity of Social Darwinism encouraged courts to invalidate legislation
that improved conditions for the working class.188 Recently, scholars have begun
to revisit the claim that Social Darwinism influenced the Lochner Court.189 The
degree to which the Court was influenced by laissez-faire and Social Darwinism
is beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, it is enough to understand
that powerful corporate interests were a dominant factor in American politics at
the time. The nation was divided on the issues of labor and the economy: While
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Republicans touted the economic value of corporations, Democrats celebrated
the populist movement against corporate control. In the election of 1896,
Republican William McKinley defeated Democrat William Jennings Bryan, and
corporate interests triumphed over labor interests.190 McKinley’s victory marked
the emergence of a powerful corporate presence in American politics. At the same
time, the Court began to support corporate interests as well. A banker characterized
the Court in 1895 as the “guardian of the dollar, defender of private property,
enemy of spoliation, sheer anchor of the Republic.”191 Protection of corporate
interests through the Due Process Clause, unlike protection of workers or racial
minorities, had firm political support at the turn of the century, as manifested by
McKinley’s victory.
The political environment at the turn of the century allowed the Court to
define economic liberties as part of the protection of due process. Protection of
economic liberties, however, was not a sudden emergence.192 Hovenkamp argues
that the Fourteenth Amendment was “economic by design” and that Congress
“intended to provide certain substantive rights, protecting freedmen from some
kinds of governmental activity.” 193 He continues: “That these absolute rights
should be identified with economic liberties was uncontroversial. But economic
liberties had to be defined. That was the province of political economy.” 194
In 1897, the political and economic climate allowed the Court to define
these economic liberties under the Due Process Clause in a way favorable to
corporate interests.

V. Conclusion
The historical role of the Due Process Clause and its substantive and
procedural meanings are more complicated than is traditionally understood. The
Due Process Clause was understood as a residual protection of liberty and had an
expansive and substantive interpretation to protect rights enumerated in the Bill
of Rights, as well as those protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. As we
have seen, the Court did not invoke the Fourteenth Amendment conception of
due process to defend the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights from state
infringement, and states had great latitude to formulate their own procedures.
The Court, however, maintained its authority to strike down legislation if it
was arbitrary or violated a fundamental right of due process, although it did not
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invoke this authority until 1897. The Court thus ensured that the Due Process
Clause did not lose its meaning in theory, even if it had little meaning in practice.
This curious treatment of due process cannot easily be explained. A variety
of social, political, and economic factors influenced the Court’s jurisprudence.
Racism, economic instability, lack of political support, and administrative burdens
all may have contributed to the Court’s practice of declining to expansively apply
the due process protections while still preserving the concept of due process for a
time when these barriers would no longer play such a significant role. When the
Court obtained the political backing of powerful corporations, it used the Due
Process Clause to protect corporations from “unreasonable” state legislation.
For a variety of reasons, the Court declined to apply substantive due process
in individual cases. But contrary to conventional discourse on the development of
the doctrine, the Court did not completely relinquish the substantive power of the
Due Process Clause. In exiling substantive due process, the Court continued to
invite its eventual return. Still today, we see that substantive due process remains
a key doctrine limiting state power and protecting individual rights.
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